The threat actor was also able to copy a backup of customer vault data from the encrypted storage container which is stored in a proprietary binary format that contains both unencrypted data, such as website URLs, as well as fully-encrypted sensitive fields such as website usernames and passwords, secure notes, and form-filled data. There is another interesting aspect here: how long did it take to copy the data for millions of users? Why didn’t LastPass detect this before the attackers were done with it? We won’t learn that in their statement. Of course, LastPass doesn’t mention this implication, hoping that the less tech-savvy users won’t realize. Which is now in the hands of an unknown threat actor. And if you are an active LastPass user, that data should be good enough to create a complete movement profile. And since they don’t state how many they were storing, we have to assume: all of them. We learn here that LastPass was storing your IP addresses. To date, we have determined that once the cloud storage access key and dual storage container decryption keys were obtained, the threat actor copied information from backup that contained basic customer account information and related metadata including company names, end-user names, billing addresses, email addresses, telephone numbers, and the IP addresses from which customers were accessing the LastPass service. Is that supposed to be reassuring, considering that the cloud storage in question apparently had a copy of all the LastPass data? Or is this maybe an attempt to shift the blame: “It wasn’t our servers that the data has been lifted from”? The cloud storage service accessed by the threat actor is physically separate from our production environment. It likely did already before they declared victory in September 2022, which also sheds a bad light on them. Note also how LastPass avoids mentioning when this “target another employee” happened. Yes, this interpretation is far less favorable of LastPass, which is why they likely try to avoid it. And because of that failure people’s data is now gone. So the more correct interpretation of events is: we do not have a new breach now, LastPass rather failed to contain the August 2022 breach. But using information gained in the initial access in order to access more assets is actually a typical technique used by threat actors. LastPass is trying to present the August 2022 incident and the data leak now as two separate events. While no customer data was accessed during the August 2022 incident, some source code and technical information were stolen from our development environment and used to target another employee, obtaining credentials and keys which were used to access and decrypt some storage volumes within the cloud-based storage service. We’ll soon see how transparent they really are in their statement. LastPass is actually required by US law to immediately disclose a data breach. In fact, this has little to do with any commitment. In keeping with our commitment to transparency, we want to provide you with an update regarding our ongoing investigation. Let’s start with the very first paragraph: As I know that not everyone can see through all of it, I thought that I would pick out a bunch of sentences from this statement and give some context that LastPass didn’t want to mention. Their statement is also full of omissions, half-truths and outright lies. LastPass likely could have prevented this if they were more concerned about keeping their users secure than about saving their face. Security professionals weren’t amused, this holiday season became a very busy time for them. As people have speculated, this timing was likely not coincidental but rather intentional to keep the news coverage low. Right before the holiday season, LastPass published an update on their breach.
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